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WARTIME PREJUDICE AGAINST PERSONS OF ITALIAN
DESCENT: DOES THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION?
joseph C. Mauro*
Most people know that the United States intenled persons f/japanese descent
during World War II. Few people know, however, that the governnent interned
persons of German and Italian descent as well. In fact, the internment was part of a
larier national security program, in which the government class ified non-citizens of
all three ethnicities as "enemy aliens" and subjected then to nnnerous restrictions,
includifn q arrest, intenmnent, expulsion from certain areas, crfews, identification
cards, loss of employment, and restrictions on travel and property.
Four decades after the war, Cos,ress decided to compensate persons of Japanese
descent who had been "deprived qf liberty or property" by these restrictions.
Congress has not, however, redressed the hann done to persons of German or
Italian descent. This Note explores why Congqress decided to distinguish between
victims of Japanese and Italian descent, why the D.C. Circuit held that the
distinction does not violate equal protection, and the potential impact of new
historical evidence on both conclusions.
IN T R O D U C T IO N ........................................................................ 446
I. WHAT HAPPENED TO ENEMY ALIENS DURING THE WAR? .......... 449
A. Enemy Aliens in United States History ......................... 449
B. Enemy Alien Restrictions During World War II ................ 450
1. E arly A rrests ....................................................... 450
2. Geographic Exclusions ........................................ 452
3. Identification C ards ............................................. 453
4. Property R estrictions .......................................... 454
5. T ravel R estrictions .............................................. 454
6. C urfew R estrictions ............................................ 455
C. End of Restrictions on Persons of Italian Descent .............. 455
II. To WHAT EXTENT DID RACIAL PREJUDICE MOTIVATE
WARTIME RESTRICTIONS ON PERSONS
OF ITALIAN D ESCENT? ............................................................ 456
A . W hat is Racial Prejudice? .......................................... 456
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank
Professor William J. Novak for guiding my research and writing. I would also like to thank
my fellow members of the Miclh(an Journal of Race & Law, especially Mei Li Zhen and
Rebecca Oyama, for their substantive and stylistic edits. As always, I would like to thank
my friends and family for their constant support. Finally, I would like to thank my 103
year-old grandmother, Isabelle Alice Mauro, for inspiring this Note and inspiring me.
Michigan journal of Race & Law[
B. Evidence of Racial Prejudice Against Persons
of Italian D escent .................................................... 457
1. Historians' Findings of Racial Prejudice
Against Persons of Italian Descent ....................... 457
2. Similarity Between Restrictions on Persons
of Japanese Descent and Restrictions on
Persons of Italian Descent ................................... 458
3. Evidence from the Decision Not to Intern
Italians En M asse ................................................. 462
C. Evidence Against Racial Prejudice Toward Persons
of Italian D escent .................................................... 468
1. Evidence that Racism Accounted for the
Differences Between Restrictions on
Persons ofJapanese Descent and Restrictions on
Persons of Italian D escent ................................... 468
2. Evidence Suggesting Enemy Alien Restrictions
on Persons of Italian Descent were Justified
by M ilitary C oncerns .......................................... 469
1Il. IS COMPENSATION APPROPRIATE FOR PERSONS OF
ITALIAN DESCENT HARMED BY PREJUDICIAL
W ARTIM E R ESTR CTIONS? ...................................................... 472
C O N C LU SIO N ............................................................................. 475
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Arthur Jacobs brought a class action lawsuit alleging that
the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 violated equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment.' The Act compensated persons of Japanese descent who
were "deprived of liberty or property" as a result of prejudicial govern-
ment policies during World War 1I.2 It did not distinguish between
Japanese Americans and permanent resident aliens of Japanese descent,
compensating both groups equally.' Jacobs, a German American who had
been interned during the war, based his equal protection claim on the fact
that the Act did not compensate other ethnic groups that had been in-
terned.4 The D.C. Circuit denied his claim, holding that Congress'
1. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F2d 313,314 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989b-7(2)(B)(i) (West 2009);Jacobs, 959 E2d at 314.
3. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989b-7 (West 2009).The Act, like many of the sources cited
in this Note, uses the term "Japanese American" to refer to American citizens ofJapanese
descent and permanent resident aliens of Japanese descent. Id. For clarity, I use the terms
"Japanese American," "italian American," and "German American" to refer to American
citizens only. The distinction is important historically, and would be unclear if I followed
the Act's usage. The reader should note, however, that the distinction carries no legal sig-
nificance. Id. The Act protects Japanese American citizens and permanent resident aliens
equally. Id.
4. Jacobs, 959 F2d at 314.
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decision to compensate only victims of Japanese descent "could survive
the strictest level of scrutiny."' The court reasoned that persons ofJapanese
descent had been "detained en masse because of racial prejudice"-a his-
torical wrong that Congress could redress-whereas wartime restrictions
on persons of German and Italian descent had not been unlawfully moti-
vated."
At about the time Jacobs was decided, a number of historians began
researching the wartime restrictions on persons of Italian descent . By
conducting personal interviews and reviewing internal memoranda of the
Roosevelt Administration, these historians discovered that persons of Ital-
ian descent suffered nearly all of the wartime restrictions imposed on
persons ofJapanese descent, including arrests, curfews, identification cards,
travel restrictions, geographic exclusions, property restrictions, loss of em-
ployment, and, for some, internment." As written, most of the restrictions
applied only to non-citizens, who were labeled "enemy aliens." In prac-
tice, however, the restrictions affected American citizens of German,
5. Id. at 318. The court noted that it was only required to apply "intermediate
scrutiny" to the statute. Id. at 314 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
Following Paradise, however, the court applied strict scrutiny "for demonstrative purposes
only." Id. It then addressed both standards at once, holding that "Congress' decision to
compensate Japanese but not German Americans is substantially related (as well as nar-
rowly tailored) to the important (and compelling) governmental interest of compensating
those who were interned during World War I1 because of racial prejudice." Id. at 321.
6. Jacobs, 959 F2d at 314, 313, 317, 322 (citing COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 317 (Univ. ofWash. Press 1997)
(1982-83)). The Act also compensated Aleuts who were deprived of liberty and property,
not because of racial prejudice, but due to oversight and disregard by American military
commanders in Alaska. 50 U.S.C.A. app. 1989a (West 2009). The D.C. Circuit did not
address the claim that Mr. Jacobs was similarly situated to the Aleuts because he did not
allege that the United States had failed to provide him with adequate care or held him
longer than necessary. Jacobs, 959 F2d at 314 (citing 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989a (West
2009)). Because the Italian experience was not at all similar to that of the Aleuts, but was
arguably similar to the Japanese experience, this Note focuses on Jacobs' reasons for holding
that Congress did not violate equal protection by deciding to compensate persons ofJapa-
nese descent exclusively. Seegerally id.
7. See, e.g., UNA STORIA SEGRETA (Lawrence DiStasi ed., 2001); STEPHEN Fox, UN-
CIVIL LIBERTIES: ITALIAN AMERICANS UNDER SIEGE DURING WORLD WAR 11 (2000); STEPHEN
Fox, THE UNKNOWN INTERNMENT (1990) [hereinafter UNKNOWN INTERNMENT]; Paula
Branca-Santos, Injustice Ignored: The Interiment of Italian-Anlericans Durings WWII, 13 PACE
[NT'L L. REV. 151 (2001); Rose Scherini, The Other Internment: Wien Italian-Anmericans Were
Enemy Aliens, AMBASSADOR, Fall 1993; James Brooke, After Silence, Italians Recall the Intern-
ment, N.Y TIMES Aug. 11, 1997, at A10; 'Secret' of WWII: Italian-Amnericaris Forced to Move,
CNN ONLINE, Sept. 21, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/US/9709/21/italian.relocation (last
visited Dec. 7, 2009).
8. See generally COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 317 (Univ. of Wash. Press 1997) (1982-83) [hereinafter PER-
SONAL JUSTICE].
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Italian, and Japanese descent as well." Of course, American citizens of
Japanese descent were eventually interned en masse, while American citi-
zens of Italian descent were not."' This difference likely explains why
many people know about the Japanese experience yet have not heard
about the restrictions imposed upon persons of Italian descent." It also
probably explains why.Jacobs held that the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 did
not violate equal protection. Congress chose, however, to extend com-
pensation under the Act beyond the mass citizen-internment,
compensating aliens as well citizens and redressing other kinds of depriva-
tions. 2 For this reason, a significant gap exists between how the law treats
persons of Japanese descent harmed by the "enemy alien" restrictions and
how it treats persons of Italian descent harmed by the same provisions.
This Note asks, therefore, whether a person of Italian descent who
was "deprived of liberty or property" during World War 11 as a result of
the government's enemy alien restrictions could bring a successful equal
protection claim against the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.13 Part I details the
restrictions imposed on persons of Japanese, German, and Italian descent
during the war. Part II examines the extent to which racial prejudice mo-
tivated the wartime restrictions on persons of Italian descent.'4 Part III
considers whether the government should compensate persons of Italian
descent who were deprived of liberty as a result of prejudicial wartime
restrictions. This Note concludes that the newly-uncovered historical evi-
dence at least undermines Jacobs to the extent that, if a court desired to
uphold the Act again, it would need to find new and stronger reasons to
do so.
9. See generally Gloria Lothrop, Unwlcooue in Freedomns Land, in UNA STORIA
SEGRETA, siopra note 7, at 161.
10. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8.
11. Following the surge of historical interest in the wartime restrictions on persons
of Italian descent, Congress passed the Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liber-
ties Act, which found that the United States had committed a "fundamental injustice"
against Italian Americans, 600,000 of whom had been deprived of liberty as a result of
government policies. Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. No.
106-451, 114 Stat. 1947 (2000). The Act ordered the Attorney General to "conduct a
comprehensive review of the treatment by the United States Government of Italian
Americans during World War 11" and submit a report of its findings to Congress. Id. The
Department of Justice published its report in November 2001. U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE RLESTRICTIONS ON
PERSONS OF ITALIAN ANCESTRY DURING WORLD WAR II (2001), available at http://
www.justice.gov/crt/Italian-.Report.pdf.
12. 50 U.S.C.A. app.§ 1989b-7 (West 2009).
13. Id. S 1989a.
14. Jacobs, 959 E2d at 318-19 (citing 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989a (West 2009);
PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 3).
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I.WHAT HAPPENED TO ENEMY ALIENS DURING THE WAR?
A. Enemy Aliens in United States History
President Adams created the category of "alien enemy" when he
signed the Alien Enemy Act of 1798.' s The Act authorized the President
to impose travel, curfew, and property restrictions on male aliens from
enemy nations during times of war." Although the Act was used during
most wars, restrictions against enemy aliens were harshest during World
War II, when the government deprived hundreds of thousands of persons
of their property, homes, businesses, and other liberties such as travel,
communication, and the right to one's person.' 7 The government detained
over one hundred thousand enemy aliens-in jails or internment
camps-for months or even years.18
These restrictions were not conducted behind closed doors. They
were the explicit and intentional policies of the United States. For exam-
ple, the Immigration and Naturalization Service included this statement
in a training lecture on May 13, 1943:
[t]he declaration of war effects a great transformation in the
status of aliens who are designated as alien enemies. These in-
dividuals then technically lose all their constitutional rights and
privileges, and find that "what others [do] confidently and of
right, they [do] by sufferance and doubtfully, uncertain of the
restrictions of the morrow.""
While harsh, such policies were in fact a compromise between the
politically- and constitutionally-minded Roosevelt Administration and
the skittish military, which favored extending the restrictions to millions
20
more.
15. U.S. DEP'T OrJUSTICF, supra note 11,at 16.
16. td.; 50 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West 2009).
17. Seegenerally U.S. DEP'r OFJusTICE, supra note 11; PERSONAL JUSTICE., supra note 8.
18. See cnerally U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 11; PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8.
During the Wfar of 1812, President Madison used the Act to renmove enemy alien males
from coastal areas. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 16. President Wilson signed an
amended version of the Act on April 16, 1918, extending enemy alien classification to all
"natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects" of enemy nations over the age of fourteen, both
male and female. Id. at 16 n.5 6 ; 50 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West 2009). As amended, the Act was
incorporated into the United States Code, where it still stands in effect. 50 U.S.C.A. 5 21
(West 2009). President Wilson also issued a declaration imposing property and travel re-
strictions on all aliens of German descent residing in the United States. Id.; U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 16 n.56. Finally, Wilson reserved the right to arrest and detain
enemy aliens as "necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United
States." 40 Stat. 1650 (1917).
19. U.S. DEPT OFJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 3 n. 10 (emphasis added).
20. See id. at 9.
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B. Enemy Alien Restrictions During World War II
J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, began a program in 1936 to
collect information about U.S. residents, both aliens and citizens, who had
"roots" in nations that would likely oppose the United States if the devel-
oping world conflict turned into war.2 ' Working with this information, in
June 1939 the FBI, Navy, and Army sorted potentially dangerous aliens
into three categories based on their perceived level of threat. 2 Known as
the "ABC List," this project based each alien's dangerousness on his level
of involvement in "ethnic, cultural, or assistance organizations. '3 The most
dangerous category (A) included leaders in such organizations, while the
second most dangerous (B) included members. 4
At the beginning of the war, Italian Americans were the largest for-
eign-born population in the United States, numbering 1,623,580 in
1940. ' For this reason, some considered them particularly threatening
after the attack on Pearl Harbor.2 " Even in California, the plurality of en-
emy aliens hailed from Italy, numbering 52,008 Italians against 38,171
Japanese and 19,417 Germans. 7
1. Early Arrests
On the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor-December 7,
1941-Edward Ennis, director of the Department of Justice's Enemy
Alien Control Unit, began apprehending Japanese aliens who he believed
were dangerous.2 " Ennis took this action a few hours before President
Poosevelt issued Proclamation 2525, which formally authorized various
restrictions on Japanese aliens, including their immediate arrest by the
Attorney General or the Secretary of War.2" Similarly, the next morning
Ennis began arresting German and Italian aliens, and the President fol-
lowed later that day with Proclamations 2526 and 2527, which covered
21. Id. at2.
22. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 167.The lists were developed about two months before
Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, eliciting declarations of war from England
and France.
23. U.S. DEP'T o JuSTICE, supra note 11, at 3.
24. Id.
25. Constantine Panunzio, Italian Americans, Fascism, and the War, 31 YALE REv. 771,
771 (1943).
26. See id. Adding to their potential threat was the fact that they were "comparative
newcomers, presumably more under the influence of their parent country than earlier
immigrants .... Id.
27. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 162.
28. Id. at 167.
29. Id.; U.S. DEP'r orJusTiCE, supra note 1I, at 4.
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them with the same restrictions.v' All Japanese, German, and Italian citi-
zens over the age of fourteen were labeled enemy aliens."'
In the initial rush to action, the FBI arrested American citizens of
Italian descent along with their alien friends and relatives."'2 The arrests
took place throughout the country, including in New York City, where
international opera star Ezio Pinza was arrested and confined on Ellis Is-
land."" Many of these early arrests were made without credible evidence,
as the government believed it needed to take immediate action. By the
end ofJanuary, 1942, about 3000 aliens had been arrested.-"
Of those arrested during the first weeks after Pearl Harbor, none was
to be interned without an individual hearing." The government did not
have the means to conduct such hearings, however, until more than six
weeks after the arrests began. ' Not until January 23, 1942, did Attorney
General Francis Biddle announce the creation of the Alien Enemy Hear-
ing Boards.3" Each federal judicial district managed one hearing board,
which was comprised of three civilians from the locality tasked with de-
termining whether the enemy aliens who appeared before them should
be interned, released with parole, or released outright.3" During the hear-
ings, enemy aliens could bring affidavits and call witnesses, but could not
be represented by attorneys."' As a result, about half of the Italians brought
before the boards were interned, and some were given the choice of be-
ing interned or enlisting in the military.4' According to a recent report by
the Department of Justice (DOJ), many of the internments likely violated
immigration or registration laws and were influenced by little more than a
neighbor's suspicion.4 ' What is more, the hearing boards could not handle
30. U.S. DEP'T OF Jusric, supra note 11, at 4;J. Edgar Hoover, Alic, Ellnmy Conitrol,
29 IowA L. R.Ev. 396,400 (1944).Thus, for each of the three ethnic groups, the first day of
arrests was authorized solely by the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, after which the arrests
were authorized by presidential proclamation. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 167; 50 U.S.C.A.
21 (West 2009).
31. U.S. DiE'r oF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 17. On July 17, 1942, the DOJ subjected
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian aliens to enemy alien restrictions as well, with the
exception of the travel restrictions. Hoover, supra note 30, at 403.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id.
35. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 168.
36. U.S. DEPT OFJusTiCE, supra note 11, at 7.
37. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 172.
38. Id.
39. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTIcE, supra note 11, at 7.
40. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 172.
41. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 7; Italian-American Museum Opeis "Enemy
Aliet," Exhibit, VOANews.com, Oct. 13, 2002, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-
13-a-2002-10-13-11-Italian-67409422.htnl?moddate=2002-10-13 (last visited Dec. 8,
2009).
42. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 7.
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the large number of aliens who had been arrested.'3 By June 5, 1942, only
2548 of the 8500 enemy aliens arrested had been given a hearing before
the boards.4' Thus, the vast majority of enemy aliens arrested were jailed
for over six months without any kind of review.
2. Geographic Exclusions
On January 29, 1942, Biddle announced that enemy aliens would
have to evacuate a number of areas along the west coast, including parts of
the San Francisco waterfront and certain areas in Los Angeles.4' Two days
later, he added sixty-nine areas in California and set the deadline for
evacuation to February 15." He added fifteen areas in California on Feb-
ruary 2 and thirty one areas in Oregon and Washington on February 4."
He also added eighteen areas in Arizona on February 7, which had to be
evacuated within two weeks. " In California alone, more than 10,000 per-
sons of Italian descent, both aliens and citizens, were forced to abandon
their homes and places of work."' American citizens were affected as well
because "[t]he aged and infirm [were] not ... permitted to remain with
naturalized sons and daughters in [the designated] areas."'" According to
an announcement in the Los Aneles Times, the government planned to
move the enemy aliens to "farm colonies" where they would be used for
agricultural labor.' Moreover, even in places where enemy aliens were
not forced to move, they had to remain at all times within five miles of
their homes except to go directly to and from work. 2
Violation of these geographic restrictions resulted in arrest and in-
ternment "for the duration of the war.' ' 13 Even for those who could
comply with the restrictions, the effects were severe. Fishermen were
most affected, as 80% of California's fishing fleet was of Italian descent."
For example, between 2500 and 3000 fishermen of Italian descent were
43. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173.
44. Id.
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1 1, at 19.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Rose D. Scherini, 14ien Italian Americans Were "Enety Aliens," in UNA STOmA
SEGcRinA, supra note 7, at 18.
50. EvictedJaps to be Put in Far, Camps, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1942, at 3, 6.
51. Id. at 3.
52. U.S. DEP'T OFJus-riCE, s11pra note 11, at 20.
53. Alien Crack-Down: 35,000 Not Registering Face Drastic US. Action, S.F. CHRoN.,
Feb. 13, 19 42, at 13; see also U.S. DEP'T OI'JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 20.
54. Scherini, supra note 49, at 20.
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forced to leave the city of Monterey, California." According to Stephen
Fox, Professor of History at Humboldt State University, this relocation
policy "broke up families, interrupted education, [and] forced bread win-
ners to find new employment and new homes ... ,,",
When President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on Febru-
ary 19, 1942, authorizing mass internment of both aliens and citizens, all
parties involved believed that persons of Japanese, German, and Italian
descent would be evacuated en masse from the West Coast.' Indeed, Ex-
ecutive Order 9066 did not distinguish between the three groups, giving
the Secretary of War the power to exclude anyone he considered a threat
from sensitive areas. " Wholesale evacuations on a massive scale were, in
fact, nearly carried out. On February 2, 1942, Los Angeles and Orange
County, California, asked the U.S. military to remove all enemy aliens,
regardless of ethnicity, from their respective jurisdictions; s The American
Legion and the Council of California Women's Clubs petitioned for all
enemy aliens to be expelled from the state."" Army Lieutenant General
John DeWitt, leader of the Western Defense Command, also proposed
interning all enemy aliens in California." Congress responded to these
proposals in mid February 1942 by creating the Tolan Committee, which
recommended mass internment for persons of Japanese descent only."
2
Final authority, however, rested with the Army, which meant that DeWitt
would have the final say about which groups to intern. His plan to in-
tern all three ethnic groups was- thwarted at the last moment by the
President himself.6
4
3. Identification Cards
Beginning on January 14, 1942, the DOJ ordered all enemy aliens to
carry identification cards. ' The cards contained the carrier's fingerprint,
signature, and "likeness.,6 Enemy aliens were required to obtain the cards
55. Stephen Fox, The Relocation of Italian Ainericans in California During World War II,
in UNA STORIA SEGRETA, supra note 7, at 43-45.
56. UNKNOWN INTERNMENT, supra note 7, at xiii, 224.
57. U.S. DEP'T oFJUsTIcE, supra note 11, at 9, 15.
58. Id. at 15. Public Law 77-503, in turn, provided criminal penalties for violations
of military proclamations made pursuant to Executive Order 9066. Id. at 16.
59. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 178.
60. Id.
61. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 9.
62. Fox, supra note 55, at 43-45.
63. Id. at 46.
64. Scherini, supra note 49, at 21; PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 98.
65. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173-75.
66. Id.
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by February 12.'v The Los Angeles Times reported that during the first two
days of registration, a "block-long line" of 6800 people formed to apply
for the cards." Still, more than 35,000 enemy aliens failed to meet the
February 12 deadline."' The penalty for failing to obtain a card was "in-
ternment for the duration of the war," though it is unclear whether this
penalty was enforced against all 35,000 aliens who failed to register."
4. Property Restrictions
On December 31,1941, the DOJ announced a national ban on cer-S 71
tain kinds of property for enemy aliens. Pursuant to this directive, all
Japanese, Germans, and Italians had to relinquish short wave radios, radio
transmitters, firearms, and cameras to government authorities.7 2 On Janu-
ary 6, Biddle added more articles to the list, including ammunition,
explosive material, material used in the manufacture of explosives, signal
devices, codes or ciphers, anything containing invisible writing, and all
other "implements of war" (including binoculars) and pictorial represen-
tations thereof.7 3 Those who violated the property restrictions were
arrested, leading to more than 1500 arrests.7 4 One can imagine the effect
such restrictions must have had on self-employed persons who needed
such tools for work.
The Coast Guard also seized boats in California from both aliens
and citizens, without review, to patrol for submarines." Of course, with
the predominance of Italian fishermen in California, they were most
heavily affected by this policy.7" But since the government had already
forbidden persons of Italian descent from fishing, losing the boats was sec-
ondary.
7
5.Travel Restrictions
On February 5, 1942, the DOJ restricted the travel of enemy
aliens.7' Under regulations titled "Controlling Travel and Other Conduct
67. Alien Crack-Down, supra note 53, at 13.
68. Aliens Flocking to Register Unit, L.A.TIMES, Feb. 4, 1942, at 6.
69. Alien Crack-Down, supra note 53, at 13.
70. Id.
71. Alien Radio Ban Now Nation-Wide,S.F CRoN.,Jan. 1, 1942, at 8.
72. Id.
73. Aliens: Guns, Cameras Have Final Deadline, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1942, at 10;
Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173--75.
74. Scherini, supra note 49, at 16.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Fox, supra note 55, at 43-45.
77. U.S. DEP'T oFJusTrcE, supra note 11, at 31.
78. Id. at 17.
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of Aliens of Enemy Nationalities," the DOJ forbade enemy aliens
throughout the country from traveling outside their communities except
for work, worship, or to report to certain government agencies.79 When
they did travel, they were required to file travel documents with the local
U.S. Attorney, who would forward the information to the FBI."The DOJ
could grant individual exceptions."' On February 14, 1942, the DOJ nar-
rowed the travel restrictions to specific areas along the West Coast that
had been designated as important for the war effort. 2
6. Curfew Restrictions
On February 4, 1942, Biddle announced that all enemy aliens
within a certain area were required to remain in their homes between
9:00pm and 6:00am . This "restricted area" was quite large, encompassing
"the entire coastline of California from the Oregon border south to a
point approximately fifty miles north of Los Angeles and extending inland
for distances varying from thirty to one hundred and fifty miles. ',"4 The
penalty for violating the curfew restriction was arrest and immediate in-
ternment.9 The DOJ made no exception for workers with night shifts."'
C. End of Restrictions on Persons of Italian Descent
Enemy alien restrictions on persons of Italian descent ended gradu-
ally. In May, 1942, the President signed the Second War Powers Act, which
waived residence, language, and literacy requirements for foreign-born
members of the U.S. military who wanted to apply for citizenship.17 Two
months later, he declassified all enemy aliens who satisfied any of these
requirements: serving in the armed forces, continued residence in the U.S.
since 1916, married to a U.S. citizen without having returned to his or
her homeland since 1926, or having applied for citizenship before the
attack on Pearl Harbor. " On Columbus Day, 1942 (October 12), Biddle
announced at Carnegie Hall, along with New York Mayor Fiorello La-
Guardia, that Italians would not be included in the category of enemy
79. 28 C.ER. § 30.1 (1942); U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, supra note 11, at 17.
80. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 17.
81. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173--75.
82. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 18.
83. Id. at 19-20.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 20; Alien Crack-Down, supra note 53, at 13.
86. Alien Crack-Down, supra note 53, at 13.
87. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 187-88.
88. Id. at 188.
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aliens after October 19, 1942." While Germans and Japanese would re-
main classified as enemy aliens until later in the war, this Note focuses on
the first ten months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when enemy alien
restrictions applied to all three ethnic groups equally.
Il.To WHAT EXTENT DID RACIAL PREJUDICE MOTIVATE WARTIME
IIESTRICTIONS ON PERSONS OF ITALIAN DESCENT?
Given the newly-uncovered historical evidence about the breadth of
the enemy alien restrictions, persons of Italian descent almost certainly
experienced the same kind of racial prejudice that persons of Japanese
descent experienced. Though neither Congress nor Jacobs developed a
comprehensive definition of racial prejudice, wartime restrictions on per-
sons of Italian descent were probably prejudicial under any definition.
First, the restrictions on persons of Italian descent were nearly identical to
the restrictions on persons of Japanese descent, which both Congress and
Jacobs found to be prejudicial. Moreover, the differences between the re-
strictions on persons of Italian descent and the restrictions on persons of
Japanese descent are best explained by practical, economic, and political
factors, not greater prejudice against the latter group. Although the gov-
ernment may have harbored more prejudice against persons of Japanese
descent, and may have had legitimate reasons to fear resident aliens of Ital-
ian descent, the weight of the evidence suggests that the wartime
restrictions on persons of Italian descent were motivated by the same ra-
cial prejudice that motivated the restrictions on persons of Japanese
descent.
A. What is Racial Prejudice?
The congressional report detailing racial prejudice against persons of
Japanese descent, upon which Congress relied when passing the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, does not provide a comprehensive definition of
prejudice."' In the introduction to the report, the commission outlines the
conclusion that it aims to prove: that "the detention of Japanese Ameri-
cans during World War II was ... an act of racial discrimination.", Later,
the report suggests two criteria that made such actions discriminatory.
First, the fact that restrictions were motivated by public hostility toward
persons of Japanese descent suggests that they were prejudicial.' 2 As the
congressional report states, the "evacuation decision was ignited by the
89. Id.
90. See generally 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989a (West 2009); PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8.
91. Civil Liberties Pub. Educ. Fund, Proloie to PERsoNA JusTIcE, supra note 8, at xiii.
92. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 28.
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fire of [impotent anger against the Japanese], especially in California."' 3
Second, the link between the wartime restrictions and the history of"in-
stitutionalized segregation" ofJapanese Americans supports the conclusion
that the former was prejudicial just like the latter.'4 Both of these factors
(public hostility and a history of institutionalized segregation) may have
applied to restrictions on persons of Italian descent as well.
Jacobs provides a somewhat clearer definition of prejudice, although
it is by no means comprehensive. First, the court did not actually find that
the government had committed acts of prejudice against persons of Japa-
nese descent, holding instead that it was required to defer to Congress'
finding with respect to such a complex empirical question.9' The court
still reasoned, however, that when restrictions are imposed en masse against
a certain ethnic group, they are presumptively evidence of racial preju-
dice." Perhaps, then, the key criterion under Jacobs for determining
whether the government treated Italians with racial prejudice is simply
whether it subjected them to race-based restrictions en masse.97 This Part
argues that it likely did. Regardless, recognizing that neither the D.C. Cir-
cuit nor Congress meant to enunciate a comprehensive definition of
"racial prejudice," this Part explores other conceptions of prejudice as
well, considering various kinds of evidence which may suggest that per-
sons of Italian descent experienced "the same racial prejudice" as persons
of Japanese descent."" If they did, then the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 may
indeed violate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.
B. Evidence of Racial Prejudice Against Persons of Italian Descent
1. Historians' Findings of Racial Prejudice Against
Persons of Italian Descent
Most historians who have researched the wartime restrictions on
persons of Italian descent believe that they were motivated by racial
prejudice. Professor Lawrence DiStasi, for example, believes the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 45-46.
95. Jacobs, 959 E2d at 318-19 (" 'With respect to [a] "coplex" empirical question, we
are required to give great weight to the decisions of Congress'. .7. [and w]e see no difference
between 'great weight' and 'deference,' which the Supreme Court and this Court have
consistently treated as synonyms.") (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. EC.C., 497 U.S. 547
(1990)).
96. Jacobs, 959 E2d at 319.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 320 (citing Kazenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)). At least nei-
ther Congress nor the D.C. Circuit claimed to employ a comprehensive definition of racial
prejudice. Seegenerally id.; 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989 (West 2009).
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government developed the enemy alien restrictions primarily because
Americans have always felt "insecure" about people born in other
countries." He reasons that both Italians and Japanese suffered the
restrictions because their "ways were racial, genetic, indelible," and they
either had to be Americanized or excluded from the general population
to neutralize their threatening nature in wartime."' Guido Tintori reaches
a graver conclusion, arguing that the military and FBI were infused with
"old prejudices against 'dagos' and 'wops' [that] played an important part
in shaping the fate of Italian resident aliens in the United States.""'
Indeed, Tintori goes so far as to accuse J. Edgar Hoover and the
Department of War of harboring "stubborn xenophobia" against all
enemy aliens. 1
-
1
Rose Scherini takes a slightly different tack, reasoning that enemy
aliens were simply easy to scapegoat for the attack on Pearl Harbor, thus
bringing about the restrictions against all three ethnic groups. '13 Stephen
Fox agrees with Scherini, and although he does not state that persons of
Italian descent suffered racial prejudice, he does conclude that the only
reason they avoided the same fate as persons ofJapanese descent (meaning
mass internment of American citizens and aliens) was that it would have
been too impractical to intern all three groups."" In his words, persons of
Japanese descent were the only "available scapegoats."""'5
Some of the government actors realized that they had done wrong.
Biddle, for example, in a letter to Hoover on July 16, 1943, criticized the
theory that underlay the enemy alien restrictions: "[T]he notion that it is
possible to make a valid determination of how dangerous a person is ...
without reference to time, environment, and other relevant circumstances
is impractical, unwise, and dangerous.""" Thus, following Biddle and the
historians, this Part asks whether the government substituted racial preju-
dice for those "relevant circumstances" when it imposed enemy alien
restrictions on persons of Italian descent.
2. Similarity Between Restrictions on Persons ofJapanese Descent
and Restrictions on Persons of Italian Descent
Taking for granted that persons of Japanese descent suffered racial
prejudice, as Jacobs and Congress did, the fewer the differences between
99. Lawrence DiStasi, Introduction to UNA STOmA SEGRETA, supra note 7, at xvi.
100. Id. at xvii-xviii.
101. GuidoTintori, New Discoveries, Old Prejudices, in UNA STORIA SEGRETA, stipra note
7, at 242.
102. Id. at 246-48.
103. Scherini, supra note 49, at 19.
104. UNKNOWN INTERNMEr, n, supra note 7, at xiii.
105. id.
106. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173.
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restrictions on persons of Japanese descent and restrictions on persons of
Italian descent, the smaller the basis for concluding that persons of Japa-
nese descent suffered racial prejudice while persons of Italian descent did
not.
For the first four months after the United States entered the war, the
restrictions on both groups were practically identical." 7 This changed in
April 1942, when President Roosevelt agreed to intern persons of Japa-
nese descent en masse."" Still, except for the mass internment, all the
aforementioned restrictions-including arrests, geographic exclusions,
property restrictions, travel restrictions, curfew restrictions, and identifica-
tion cards-applied equally to both groups for over ten months.""
Moreover, the threat of internment was the same for both groups. As
Biddle announced on January 7, 1942, "[A]ll alien enemies are subject to
detention and internment for the duration of the war without hearing.","'
Thus,Jacobs was wrong to state that internment without individual review
applied only to persons ofJapanese descent."'
What is more, even in the few instances where enemy alien policies
diverged along racial lines, the same justification underlay the restrictions
on both ethnic groups. In other words, even though the government ap-
plied different restrictions in a few instances to persons of Japanese
descent and persons of Italian descent, all the measures were likely moti-
vated by the same kind of racial prejudice.
J. Edgar Hoover appears to have supported this conclusion. Writing
in the Iowa Latv Review in 1944, Hoover remembered that the first time
the government made any racial distinction between persons of Japanese
descent and persons of Italian descent was on October 19, 1942, when
Biddle officially lifted enemy alien status from Italians (the announcement
had been made a week earlier on Columbus Day, a holiday traditionally
celebrated by Italian Americans)." - Considering that persons of Japanese
descent were interned en masse six months earlier in April 1942, it would
seem that Hoover misremembered the facts. But of course Hoover knew
about the mass internment, having played a significant role in it, yet he
purposely stated that the government did not distinguish between the two
107. There were only two differences: as part of the travel and property restrictions,
persons of Japanese descent were not allowed to board commercial airlines or send or
receive packages. Hoover, supra note 30, at 400. Also, after March 24, 1942, the curfew
began one hour earlier for persons of Japanese descent. U.S. DEP'T Or JUSTICE, supra note
It,at 21.
108. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 112.
109. That is, from Dec 8, 1941 until Oct 19, 1942, when the government removed
enemy alien classification from persons of Italian descent. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 188;
Hoover, supra note 30, at 400.
110. Tintori, supra note 101,at 239.
111. See 959 F.2d at 319-20 (citing PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 3).
112. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 188; Hoover, supra note 30, at 407.
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ethnic groups until October of that year." 3 Perhaps what Hoover meant,
then, is that the government viewed both groups in the same way until it
removed enemy alien classification from persons of Italian descent. In
other words, despite some variation in how the government treated the
two groups," 4 it lumped them into the same racial category following the
attack on Pearl Harbor and did not change its view until it removed Ital-
ians from the enemy alien category altogether. While of course most
persons of Italian descent did not suffer the same level of injury as persons
of Japanese descent, having been spared the mass internment, they were
still equally subject to prejudice by classification, i.e., the enemy alien re-
strictions aimed exclusively at certain ethnic groups. Thus, if the enemy
alien restrictions constituted racial prejudice against persons of Japanese
descent, then they must have constituted racial prejudice against persons
of Italian descent as well, at least for the ten months that Italians were
subject to the same policies." 's
Indeed, as Hoover remembered those ten months, one does not get
the impression that he perceived any difference between Japanese and
Italians at all.'" First, he mentions that the restrictions on Italians and
Germans "incorporated" all the restrictions on the Japanese.' '7 He de-
scribes the property restrictions, identification cards, internment, home
raids, military zones, imprisonment, and fines without reference to any
difference between the two ethnic groups."" In fact, Hoover praises poli-
cies that seem to have been based on nothing but one's background. For
example, he says that to deal with the problem of the "naturalized citizen
whose cloak of citizenship is a sham and who is dangerous to the nation's
security," the FBI used the "weapon" of "civil suit[s] to cancel the Certifi-
cate of Naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently or illegally
procured;' which was proven by showing the alien's "lack of allegiance to
the United States."'" If such policies were prejudicial, which they seem to
have been, then the fact that the government applied them to both Ital-
ians and Japanese suggests that both groups suffered prejudicial
classification.
One would be hard pressed, however, to find stronger proof of racial
prejudice than the agreement between the DOJ and the Western Defense
Command in January 1942, which stated that "merely being an enemy
113. Hoover, supra note 30, at 407.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 108-112.
115. Contemporary historians make this argument as well. For example, Stephen Fox
argues that there was no principled distinction in how the government treatedall three
ethnicities; it was simply more "convenient" to intern persons ofJapanese descent en masse.
UNKNOWN INTERNMENT, supra note 7, at xv.
116. Hoover, supra note 30.
117. Id. at 400.
118. Id. at 403-05.
119. Id. at 407.
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alien would be sufficient cause" for unannounced raids into private homes
in search of contraband.' 20 If one's ethnic background was enough to cre-
ate probable cause of disloyalty, then it seems difficult to argue that the
policy was not prejudicial. Hoover and the DOJ might respond that it was
an alien's connection to the enemy country, rather than his race or back-
ground, that motivated the restrictions against him. But the enemy alien
restrictions were not designed in this way; for they did not address them-
selves to anyone with connections to an enemy nation, but applied rather
only to people who were of the ethnicity of such nations.
In this way, perhaps nothing demonstrates racial prejudice more
clearly than Biddle's announcement of the decision to remove enemy
alien classification from persons of Italian descent. Biddle proudly stated,
"We found that 600,000 enemy aliens were in fact not enemies.' 21 If they
were not enemies, however, then the only relevant factor was that they
were aliens of a certain race.
The congressional report on the Japanese internment also suggests
that restrictions on persons of Japanese descent were prejudicial in part
because they were tied to widespread hostility among the populace pub-
lic. 12 Such was the case for restrictions on persons of Italian descent as
well. For example, although Biddle criticized the practice, many private
employers fired enemy aliens after the attack on Pearl Harbor.' -'2 The gov-
ernment, instead of correcting the problem, continued with the enemy
alien restrictions just as before. Worse, on February 1, 1942, the California
State Personnel Board removed all descendants of enemy aliens-meaning
American citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent-from state
civil service positions. 24 The California State Congress also lobbied the
federal government to remove all enemy aliens from both coasts, revealing
an attitude harsher than DeWitt's attitude toward persons of Japanese de-
scent, whom he wanted to remove from the Pacific Coast only.'25
Italians clearly suffered the effects of such public hostility. Renzo
Sereno, an analyst for the Office of War Information, stated in a report of
January 1942 that "[t]he Italians suffer from mass guilt ... increased by the
impact of discrimination .... [They] are forced to identify themselves
with the cliches with which they are associated [and] enemy registration
is per se a stigma.' ' 26 If this is the kind of harm that the Civil Liberties Act
120. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, supra note 11, at 23.
121. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 188.
122. PERSONAL JusTicE, supra note 8, at 28 (reasoning that public hostility toward a
certain ethnic group can support a finding that government policies directed at that group
were racially prejudicial).
123. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 180.
124. Id. at 181.
125. Id.
126. Tintori,supra note 101,at 246.
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of 1988 was designed to compensate, then perhaps it should compensate
Italians as well.
3. Evidence from the Decision Not to Intern Italians En Masse
Ironically, the reasons for which the administration decided not to
intern Italians en masse suggest that the government actually harbored the
same kind of prejudice against them as it harbored against the Japanese.
Specifically, if Italians were spared mass internment for practical reasons
only, then the government must have viewed them-racially, at least-just
like the Japanese; which is to say, subject to racial prejudice.
As late as March 1942, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, com-
manding general of the Eastern Defense Command, announced his
intention to evacuate all enemy aliens from sixteen states, which would
have affected 52 million people.'" Similarly, General DeWitt advocated
mass internment of all enemy aliens in California. 2 8 Only in April 1942
did DeWitt and Drum give in to President Roosevelt and concede that
the government would not intern persons of Italian or German descent
en masse.- 2 As the congressional report on Japanese internment acknowl-
edges, persons of German and Italian descent were saved from mass
internment because of the "enormous practical difficulties ... economic
dislocations ... public perceptions and ... political implications" that
would have been involved if the government had interned those groups
in the same manner as Japanese Americans.'"' If these sorts of factors justi-
fied the harsher treatment of persons of Japanese descent, as opposed to
greater racial prejudice against them, then Jacobs may have been mistaken
to find that racial prejudice affected persons of Japanese descent more
than persons of Italian descent. 
3
1
a. Practical Difficulties
Simple administrative difficulties, not racial preference, may have
been the saving grace for Italian enemy aliens. As the War Department
stated in an Advisory Recommendation of Feb 4, 1942:
Persons of Japanese descent constitute the smallest definable
class upon which those with the military responsibility for de-
fense would reasonably determine to impose restrictions ....
Similar dangers of disloyal activities by citizens of other racial
127. Fox, supra note 55, at 48-49.
128. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 9.
129. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 186.
130. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 286-87.
131. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 E2d 313,319-20 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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stocks cannot ... be handled in the same way [because of] the
insuperable problem of administration [and] disruption of de-
fense production.'3 -
As this statement suggests, even a military leadership rabid for mass
detention eventually recognized that interning 1.6 million aliens of Italian
descent, even excluding the millions of American citizens who would
have been affected, would have been a much larger endeavor than intern-
ing the 120,000 total persons ofJapanese descent in California.'3 3 Even if
Italian internment were to have been limited to DeWitt's proposal (Cali-
fornia only), 145,000 additional people would have been moved (85,000
aliens and 60,000 citizens).'34 This would have more than doubled the size
of the internment project.'35 What is more, Guido Tintori notes that the
U.S. military had learned from the experience of the British, who, follow-
ing France's surrender to the Nazis, immediately interned all enemy aliens
within their borders (62,000 people)." The British realized by December
1941 that such unthinking mass internment had wasted significant time
and energy that could have been directed toward the war effort.'37 Such
considerations may have helped prevent the United States from making
the same mistake on such a grand scale.
b. Economic Considerations and the War Effort
The government eventually recognized that it could not intern per-
sons of Italian descent en masse without significantly impairing the war
effort. The War Department issued an advisory recommendation that ex-
pressed concern that mass internment of Germans and Italians would
cause a "disruption of defense production.'3" This phrase-"disruption of
defense production"-states clearly the primary economic concern atten-
dant to proposals for interning the millions of Italians and Germans
working in the United States. 3 9 Warnings of economic disruption also
132. Fox, supra note 55, at 41-42.
133. See Panunzio, supra note 25, at 771; Army Rules Coast, Orders AllJaps Out, S.E
CHRON., Mar. 4, 1942, at 1.
134. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 186-87.
135. See id.
136. Tintori, supra note 101, at 238-39. Approximately 50,000 of the British intern-
ees were refugees from Germany, a consideration that may have weighed on American
minds as well. Id. at 238.
137. Id. at 238.
138. Fox, supra note 55, at 41-42.
139. For example, my grandfather, an Italian American attorney in New York City,
was drafted to work in a factory that produced bottle caps for the duration of the war.
Interview with Isabelle Alice Mauro, in Fairfax,Va. (Nov. 2006). He would not have been
able to make this contribution to the war effort if he had been interned or forced to move
inland.
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came from both houses of Congress.The House Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration issued a report stating that if the kind of
movement forced upon persons of Japanese descent were also forced
upon persons of German and Italian descent, the economic repercussions
would be so costly that it would be impossible to win the war. " " The
Senate Committee on Military Affairs reached a similar conclusion on
March 19, 1942, stating that only persons of Japanese descent could be
evacuated en masse, because they were smaller in number than persons of
German or Italian descent and were largely committed to agricultural
production, whereas Germans and Italians contributed to the economy in
more diversified ways.' Like the House Committee, the Senate Commit-
tee concluded that evacuating Germans and Italians was "out of the
question if we intend to win this war.
' '
1
2
Here, the example of Hawaii is instructive, for persons of Japanese
descent were spared internment on the islands for the same reason that
persons of German and Italian descent avoided internment on the
mainland. As Stephen Fox explains, a letter from Secretary of War Edwin
Stimson to Speaker of the House John McCormack shows how eco-
nomic considerations underlay both decisions.'4 3 On July 8, 1942, Stimson
wrote, "The Japanese population is so interwoven into the economic fab-
ric of the [Hawaiian] Islands that if we attempted to evacuate all Japanese
aliens and citizens, all business ... would practically stop."' 4 The congres-
sional report on Japanese internment reached a similar conclusion, stating
that economic considerations prevented the government from interning
persons of Japanese descent in Hawaii.' From this perspective, then, al-
though racial prejudice likely affected all three alien groups, it could only
be "satisfied" by wholesale internment of persons of Japanese descent in
California, because the government believed that persons of Japanese de-
scent in Hawaii and persons of German and Italian descent throughout
the country were too essential to the war effort to place in internment
camps. In other words, economics rather than racial preference saved the
latter three groups.
Fear of revolt may have motivated the decision to scrap the Italian
internment as well. Rose Scherini cites internal War Department memo-
randa that warned of the possibility that U.S. soldiers of Italian descent
would mutiny if their enemy alien parents were interned.' 4 Biddle ech-
oed the same concern in the San Francisco Chronicle on May 10, 1942,
stating that "[i]t is very important to keep the loyalty of the great mass of
140. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 186-87.
141. Fox, supra note 55, at 47.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 52.
144. Id.
145. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 269.
146. Scherini, supra note 49, at 21.
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Italians and Germans in this country."'47 While not exactly economic,
concerns about revolt or mutiny also related to the possibility of harm to
the war effort if Italians had been subjected to the same internment poli-
cies as the Japanese. Again, such non-racial motivations undermine Jacobs'
assumption that the broader restrictions on persons of Japanese descent
were caused by racial prejudice particular to that group. " '
c. Party Politics
As Rose Scherini and Stephen Fox assert, political concerns helped
motivate President Roosevelt to exclude Italians from the mass intern-
ment.14 9 At the time, Italian Americans were the largest immigrant group
in the country and the largest ethnic voting bloc.' " Moreover, they had
consistently aligned with the Democratic Party since their mass iimigra-
tion around the turn of the century."' According to Fox, however, by
1940 Italian Americans had begun to leave the Democratic Party.'5 2 This
concerned Roosevelt throughout 1941 and 1942 because midterm con-
gressional elections were set for November 3, 1942. ' ' Perhaps, then, the
decision to lift enemy alien classification from Italians in October of 1942
was not simply a happy coincidence. The celebratory announcement was
made only fifteen days before Democrats needed Italian Americans to go
to the polls for them. As Fox explains,"[e]lectoral strategy mattered most
... and the vote counters vetoed General DeWitt's grandiose plans [for
internment]."' 4
The congressional report on Japanese internment attests to the "ad-
vantages which numbers, political voices and comparative assimilation
provided in 1942's hour of crisis."' 5 If these advantages accounted for the
fact that only persons of Japanese descent were interned en masse, then
racial prejudice particular to the Japanese did not. Thus, ifJacobs were to
appear again before the D.C. Circuit, perhaps the court would need to
find new evidence to support its conclusion that racial prejudice affected
persons of Japanese descent exclusively. For any evidence stemming from
147. 8000 More Japanese are Ordered out, S.E CHRON., May 10, 1942, at 8.
148. SeeJacobs, 959 F.2d at 317.
149. Fox, supra note 55, at 49; Scherini, supra note 49, at 21.
150. Fox, supra note 55, at 49.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Scherini, supra note 49, at 21; OFFICE Or THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 3, 1942, available at
http://clerk.house.gov/nienberinfo/electionlnfo/1942election.pdf (last visited Dec. 8,
2009).
154. Fox, supra note 55, at 49.
155. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 98.
Michigan journal of Race & Law
the Japanese internment, upon which Congress (and thus Jacobs) primarily
relied, seems better explained by politics instead.' s'
d. The Dangers of Panic
Leaders in the Army also feared that evacuating Germans and Ital-
ians en masse would cause widespread panic among the American
populace. 7 Alfred Jaretski, who had been appointed by General DeWitt
to manage the evacuations in California, expressed concern about wide-
spread panic in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson on March 26, 1942.'"
Regarding DeWitt's proposal to intern all enemy aliens in California, Ja-
retski wrote, "of more importance [than the question of injustice] would
be the undoubted national repercussions of such a movement .... If pub-
lic apprehension is unnecessarily aroused in respect [to] these alien groups
[by their mass internment], public clamor for protection will greatly im-
pede the war effort."'59
Thus, Stephen Fox appears to have a valid point when he concludes
that "[e]conomics, politics, and morale rather than Californians' prejudices
drove U.S. internment policy during World War II, with race as a reinforc-
ing element.''' The greater the extent to which these practical
considerations prevented the government from interning Italians en masse,
the less reason one has to credit Jacobs' presumption that Italians were
spared simply because the government was more prejudiced toward per-
sons ofJapanese descent.
e. If Not Mass Internment, Then Intimidation?
After recognizing that it could not intern Italians en masse, the gov-
ernment may have decided that the second-best way to deal with the
danger they posed was to scare them into submission. Much of the
newly-uncovered historical evidence seems amenable to this interpreta-
tion, for the policies imposed on persons of Italian descent appear to have
been enforced with intimidation in mind. While perhaps less harmful than
internment, purposely intimidating persons of a certain ethnicity to pre-
vent them from supporting the enemy seems just as prejudicial as
interning them for the same reason.
Some government statements explicitly revealed an intention to
break the morale of enemy aliens. For example, the Tolan Committee
stated in May 1942 that relocating the Japanese might "serve as an inci-
156. Jacobs, 959 F2d at 321.
157. Fox, supra note 55, at 48.
158. Id. at 47-48.
159. Id. at 48.
160. Id. at 52.
[VOL. 15:445
Wartime Prejudice
dent sufficiently disturbing to lower seriously the morale of vast groups of
foreign-born among our people.""' In other words, interning the Japanese
would scare Italians and Germans such that they would not dare to sabo-
tage the war effort. ' 2 Fear tactics may have appeared especially
appropriate since the government could not, for practical reasons, intern
Germans and Italians in the same way as the Japanese.""
Other policies may have achieved the goal of intimidation more
underhandedly I have already argued that racial prejudice was evident in
the agreement between the DOJ and the Western Defense Command
that provided that "merely being an enemy alien would be sufficient
cause" for house raids in search of contraband.' 4 The manner in which
these and other raids were carried out, however, suggests that the agreeing
parties had more in mind than simply enforcing the letter of the law.
'
6
For example, Gloria Lothrop describes how FBI agents and local police
would crash into Italian households in the dead of night, ostensibly to
make sure the residents were obeying the curfew."'"' Citizens were affected
along with aliens, for with just one enemy alien in a house, none of the
residents could possess the forbidden items. ' 7 Apparently, Italian American
households were so disrupted that L'Italo Americano, an Italian language
newspaper that had been unquestioningly supportive of the government,
finally criticized the raids, arguing in an editorial that it was inhumane to
"waken and frighten people in the middle of the night"just to verify that
they were at home.""
But frighten people they did. According to Lothrop, many persons
of Italian descent took it upon themselves to burn anything they owned
that represented Italian culture, in hopes that the authorities would not
find a reason to take them away."'9 L'Italo Americano was probably intimi-
dated as well, for it appears to have skipped its December 12, 1941 issue,
the first issue that would have been published after the application of en-
emy alien status to persons of Italian descent.' 7 ' In sum, this evidence
161. Id. at 50.
162. My great aunt was certainly scared by the Japanese American internment. Living
in San Francisco at the time, she decided to move to NewYork in 1942 because she feared
Italian Americans would be interned along with Japanese Americans. Interview with Isa-
belle Alice Mauro, in Fairfax,Va. (Nov. 2006).
163. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 173-74.
164. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 23.
165. See PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 62.
166. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 176.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 177.
170. The roll of microfilm containing the publication skips directly from December
5 to December 19, 1941. See L'ITALo AMmERCANO, Dec. 1941, miicrofornned on WorldCat
OCLC # 11933312 (Rutgers Univ.). While this is speculation, I can think of no better
reason why only that issue was skipped.
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seems to suggest that the effect, and likely the purpose, of many enemy
alien policies was to intimidate persons of Italian descent.
C. Evidence Against Racial Prejudice Toward Persons of Italian Descent
1. Evidence that Racism Accounted for the Differences Between
Restrictions on Persons ofJapanese Descent and Restrictions
on Persons of Italian Descent
Regardless of whether racial prejudice motivated the restrictions on
persons of Italian descent, the evidence does seem to suggest that the gov-
ernment decided to intern persons of Japanese descent en masse at least
partly because of racial prejudice particular to that group. Indeed, despite
her detailed exposition of the government's mistreatment of Italians, Glo-
ria Lothrop ultimately concludes that the only explanation for why mass
internment continued against the Japanese is racial discrimination. 
7
Both military and civilian leaders perceived significant racial differ-
ences between persons of Japanese descent and persons of Italian descent.
For example, the Tolan Committee concluded that mass internment
should continue only with persons of Japanese descent because they "all
look alike."' 72 In other words, the committee believed that the Alien En-
emy Hearing Boards could not distinguish between loyal and disloyal
persons ofJapanese descent, though evidently it believed the boards could
perceive disloyalty in Italian and German faces.'7" Also, DeWitt made what
is probably his most infamous statement before Congress in January 1942,
saying,"You needn't worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases
.... But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped
off the map."'7' 4 Such particular concern about persons ofJapanese descent
was borne out in executive policy, for of all the immigrant groups serving
in the military, only persons of Japanese descent fought in segregated
combat units. '7 Moreover, when the President made agreements with
certain Latin American nations to receive and intern their Japanese, Ger-
man, and Italian citizens, most of the people interned were of Japanese
descent (approximately 2300 of 3000). Thus, to the extent that racial
prejudice accounted for the harsher treatment of persons of Japanese de-
scent, perhaps Congress was justified in deciding that only they
experienced enough prejudice to merit compensation.
171. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 187.
172. Fox, supra note 55, at 45.
173. Id.
174. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 66.
175. Id. at 193.
176. Id. at 305.
[VOL. 15:445
Wartime Prejudice
2. Evidence Suggesting Enemy Alien Restrictions on Persons of
Italian Descent were Justified by Military Concerns
If the government had legitimate reason to fear enemy aliens of Ital-
ian descent, then the wartime restrictions imposed on them may have
been motivated by legitimate concerns rather than racial prejudice. In
other words, if the DOJ and the military had legitimate reasons to believe
that persons of Italian descent posed a threat to the war effort-for exam-
ple, if they supported Mussolini or planned acts of sabotage-then
perhaps historians have less reason to believe that racial prejudice moti-
vated the wartime restrictions against them.
a. Italian American Support for Mussolini and Fascism
The government may have had good reason to believe that U.S.
residents of Italian descent supported Mussolini. Indeed, such persons did
favor fascism generally, and Mussolini specifically, well into the 1930s.' 77 As
Constantine Panunzio explained in the Yale Review in 1943, Italian
Americans felt humiliated by the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924,
both of which limited the number of immigrants who could come to the
United States from Italy each year.' 78 By implying that Italians were un-
welcome in the United States, these laws hurt their sense of ethnic
pride.' 79 Mussolini, on the other hand, restored this pride by making Italy
and Italians appear strong and successful throughout the world, at least
during the 1920s and 1930s.'"" Pride in Mussolini's fascism was bolstered
by reports from family members living in Italy who said that Mussolini
had cleaned up many of the country's traditional problems.'" '
Mussolini also expended significant effort to convince American
businessmen that his fascist project was successful and worthy of invest-
ment.12 He funded free Italian language classes for children of Italian
immigrants in the United States, distributed fascist propaganda through
Italian American organizations in the United States, arranged trips to Italy
for 300-500 Italian American children each year, and sent allegedly
charming consuls to woo American diplomats and businessmen.'" Thus,
Italian Americans understandably developed a favorable impression of
177. Panunzio, supra note 25, at 774-79.
178. Id. Such statutes, however, are likely evidence of the kind of "institutionalized
segregation" that Congress believed supported a finding of racial prejudice. See PERSONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 45-46.
179. Panunzio, supra note 25, at 774.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 774-79; Interview with Isabelle Alice Mauro, in Fairfax,VA (Nov. 2006).
182. Panunzio, supra note 25, at 774-79.
183. Lawrence DiStasi, Monto il Camierata, in UNA STOMA SEGRETA, supra note 7, at 2;
Panunzio, supra note 25, at 774-79.
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Mussolini. As Panunzio writes, "with a number of important persons in
industry, commerce, and finance, in education and politics, singing 11
Duce's praises, what Italian Americans could resist?"' "4
As it became clear, however, that Allied interests were not going to
align with Mussolini's, it seems understandable that the government
would have worried about the loyalty of the 1.6 million Italian aliens
within its borders. Indeed, Mussolini consistently reminded Italian Ameri-
cans that, under Italian law, they retained Italian citizenship up to the
seventh generation born outside Italy, meaning that practically any Italian
American could have enlisted in Mussolini's army at any time. "" What is
more, after Mussolini joined the Axis Powers in 1936, not all Italian
Americans rejected his decision.1"" While most Italian Americans ex-
pressed shock and dismay when he aligned with Hitler, some Italian
American groups began to associate with German and White Russian
clubs.'17 For example, the National Protective Order of Gentiles, an Italian
American cultural group, began to meet in the headquarters of the Ger-
man American Bund. " Also, the Italian language program in Los Angeles
public schools expelled a number of teachers who refused to use fascist
propaganda in the classroom.' " Given these facts, perhaps Hoover and the
FBI had good reason to begin compiling information in 1936 about po-
tentially subversive Italian Americans and their resident alien friends and
relatives."'
Whether the government had reason to continue to suspect such
persons, however, seems largely to depend on how quickly they rejected
Mussolini as he moved closer to Hitler and the United States moved
closer to war. Panunzio argues that persons of Italian descent in the
United States began to turn away from Mussolini when he invaded
Ethiopia in 1935, for they began to realize that the pact with Hitler was
being used to advance German interests at Italy's expense.'"' Panunzio
goes on to assert that by the time of his writing in 1943, "almost one
hundred percent" of Italian Americans had come to support the Allies in
184. Panunzio, supra note 25, at 777.
185. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 163.
186. Id. at 164. And even with respect to Italian Americans who did turn against
Mussolini, authorities often had no way of knowing that their feelings had changed. See
Fox, supra note 55, at 40.
187. Lothrop, suipra note 9, at 164. My grandmother remembers hearing on the radio
that Mussolini had joined with Hitler. Interview with Isabelle Alice Mauro, in Fairfax, Va.
(Nov. 2006). Apparently, the prevailing sentiment in her Italian American community in
Manhattan was confusion. Id. As she recounted in 2006, "We couldn't understand why he
would do that." Id.
188. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 164.
189. Id.
190. U.S. DEP'T OF Jus-ncE, supra note 11, at 2; DiStasi, supra note 183, at 2-3.
191. Panunzio, supra note 25, at 779-80.
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the war effort." 2 By that time, however, the government had recognized
this fact as well, having removed enemy alien status from persons of Italian
descent. Thus, whether the restrictions on Italians were justified seems to
depend on whether the DOJ and the Army had reason to believe that
Italians had come to oppose Mussolini by December 8, 1941, the day on
which the restrictions were instituted. In the panicked situation of the
days and months following Pearl Harbor, it is less than clear that the gov-
ernment had sufficient evidence to assure it of Italian loyalty.
b. Tle Pressing Military Situation After Pearl Harbor
Perhaps it is difficult today to understand the kind of fear that struck
the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor. For the first time
in over a century, American citizens legitimately feared that they would
be attacked, and soon. If the government did not have time to craft a
more reasonable enemy alien policy, then its actions against persons of
Italian descent would seem less suggestive of racism and more like the
best it could do with the time it had.'
As J. Edgar Hoover explained in the Iowa Law Review in 1943, en-
emy alien policies during World War II were designed to be as different as
possible from the enemy alien policies of the First World War.' '4 In the
first twenty four hours after the United States' declared war in 1916, only
sixty-three enemy aliens were taken into custody."' Hoover remembered
this number with regret, explaining that it was only by fortune that the
United States did not suffer more sabotage during the first days and
months of World War 1.'96 Determined not to make the same mistake
again, Hoover bragged that during the first twenty four hours after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, 1771 enemy aliens were detained, with nearly a
thousand more to follow in the next week." 7 Such protective attitudes
likely motivated enemy alien policies throughout the war.
What is more, early losses in the Pacific to the Japanese increased
fears of a mainland invasion. In fact, Gloria Lothrop argues that the losses
in the Pacific, and the resulting fear of invasion, actually legitimized con-
cerns about "fifth column" saboteurs, i.e., fascist supporters waiting
patiently in the United States to spring into action whenever the enemy
neared our borders.' 98 If Stephen Fox is correct to assert that April 1942
was the low point of the war for the United States (following the fall of
192. Id. at 782.
193. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 166.
194. Hoover, supra note 30, at 401-02.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Lothrop, supra note 9, at 178.
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Bataan and Corregidor to Japanese forces), then it becomes easier to un-
derstand why the Army and DOJ found it necessary to move swiftly-
perhaps even recognizing the harm to civil liberties-to protect the
greater good of national survival.'"
Ill. Is COMPENSATION APPROPRIATE FOR PERSONS OF ITALIAN DESCENT
HARMED BY PREJUDICIAL WARTIME R-ESTRICTIONS?
Faced with the new historical evidence of governnent prejudice
against persons of Italian descent, should the government compensate
them similarly to persons of Japanese descent? If so, should Congress pro-
vide the relief, or might it come through a lawsuit likeJacobs?
In 2000, Congress passed the Wartime Violation of Italian American
Civil Liberties Act, which found that the government had committed a
"fundamental injustice against Italian Americans" during the war.21' The
Act found that 600,000 persons of Italian descent were deprived of liberty
as a result of the enemy alien restrictions.2 " It ordered the DOJ to investi-
gate the restrictions on persons of Italian descent and publish a report of
its findings.2'2 The Act did not address the issue of compensation.
Although the Act did not explicitly agree with Jacobs, its language
appears to track the case in that it seems carefully worded to avoid the
words "prejudice," "discrimination," and "hysteria. 2"4 On one hand, the
Act does speak of "fundamental injustice," which might imply that Con-
gress believed that racial prejudice affected persons of Italian descent as
well as persons of Japanese descent. On the other hand, such language still
seems purposely limited when compared with the Civil Liberties Act of
1988, which states in its first paragraph that wartime restrictions on per-
sons of Japanese descent were "motivated largely by racial prejudice,
wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. 2'05 Whether Con-
gress crafted the language regarding persons of Italian descent to avoid a
challenge similar toJacobs, or whether Congress simply decided that it was
prudent and/or historically accurate to avoid stronger wording, the choice
was almost certainly conscious. This decision, in turn, suggests that Con-
gress did not consider it appropriate to compensate persons of Italian
199. Fox, supra note 55, at 40.
200. Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. No. 106-451,
§ 4(5), 114 Stat. 1947 (2000).
201. Id. § 2(1).
202. Id. § 3.
203. See id.
204. See id. (using instead phrases such as "injustices," "violations of civil liberties,"
and "violations [of] freedom"). But see 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 1989a ("[the wartime restric-
tions on persons ofJapanese descent were] motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership").
205. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989a (West 2009).
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descent, nor even necessary to consider the question. Indeed, the statute
merely recommends that the President "formally acknowledge that these
events ... represented a fundamental injustice against Italian Americans," a
statement not even rising to the level of an apology. -"
If Italians are going to be compensated, then, it will likely have to be
through an equal protection challenge similar to Jacobs. Those in favor of
compensating persons of Italian descent could argue thatJacobs made both
factual and legal errors. Legally, the D.C. Circuit was wrong to assume or
imply that the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 compensated only those who
had been interned.2 -" If the Act only compensated those who had been
interned, then the decision to single out persons of Japanese descent
would make sense, for only they were interned en masse without individ-
ual review. The statute, however, compensated both those who were
interned and those who were "confined, held in custody, relocated, or
otherwise deprived of liberty or property" during the relevant period.",
All of these measures applied to persons of Italian descent as well. Indeed,
those in favor of compensating persons of Italian descent could point to
Congress' finding in 2000 that 600,000 persons of Italian descent were
deprived of "freedom" as a result of the wartime restrictions."
As forJacobs' statement of historical facts, hopefully this Note has as
least drawn into question the court's assumption that racial prejudice did
not motivate the wartime restrictions on Italian Americans. 2'1 As men-
tioned above, neither the District Court nor the D.C. Circuit specifically
found this fact; rather, the D.C. Circuit deemed the issue an "empirical
question" with respect to which it was required to defer to Congress' fac-
tual findings.-'2 On one view, then, those in favor of compensating persons
of Italian descent could argue that factual deference to Congress now ac-
tually supports a finding of racial prejudice against persons of Italian
206. Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act 5 4(5).
207. Jacobs, 959 F2d at 319,322 (holding that the decision to compensate only Japa-
nese and Aleuts constituted "a 'perfect fit between means and ends [because it was]
substantially related ... to the end of ... compensating those who were interned because
of racial prejudice") (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526-27
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). To the extent the statute was actually
passed to compensate other kinds of harms, which applied equally to persons of Italian
and Japanese descent, the fit between means and ends seenis less perfect.
208. PERSONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 112.
209. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989b-7 (West 2009); see also Kaneko v. U.S., 122 E3d 1048
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
210. Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. No. 106-451,
114 Stat. 1947 (2000).
211. 959 F2d at 319.
212. Id. at 318-19 (citing Metro Broad., Inc. v. FC.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding
that "[w]ith respect to [a] complex empirical question, we are required to give great weight to
the decisions of Congress .... ") (internal citations omitted)) ("We see no difference be-
tween 'great weight' and 'deference,' which the Supreme Court and this Court have
consistently treated as synonyms") (internal citations omitted).
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descent, given that the Wartime Violation of Italian American Civil Liber-
ties Act may have reversed some of Congress' earlier statements about the
Italian experience. On the other hand, the fact that Congress specifically
avoided finding racial prejudice against Italians most likely means that a
person of Italian descent who wanted to bring an equal protection chal-
lenge would need to point to the research of those historians' who have
concluded that racial prejudice motivated the restrictions imposed upon
them .
Yet these considerations do not address the normative question
whether Congress or the courts, by whatever means, ought to provide
compensation for persons of Italian descent. Nothing in the legal aca-
demic literature to this point has argued for such compensation, which
makes me hesitant to do so absent overwhelming justification. Even Paula
Branca-Santos, author of the most recent and most complete legal aca-
demic article regarding the internment of persons of Italian descent, only
mentions the compensation provisions of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988
to show that the wartime experience of Japanese Americans is more
widely known.2" Thus, she argues simply that "the true story [about Ital-
ian internment] should be revealed." 25 In fact, most legal academic articles
that mention the enemy alien restrictions do so with reference to the cur-
rent war on terror, an important but wholly different inquiry.-" Moreover,
some have questioned the wisdom of monetary compensation for histori-
cal wrongs in general. -t 7
On the other hand, the issue is not really whether compensation is
necessary or appropriate, but rather, as Mr. Jacobs tried to argue, whether
our system of laws is marred by its unequal treatment of certain ethnic
groups. 2 8 If persons of Japanese descent have been legally protected
against a certain kind of harm, while other ethnic groups who suffered
213. Which might, in turn, require theplaintiff to argue around the holding inJacobs
that Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. EC.C. required courts to defer to Congress when deciding
complex empirical questions. See 959 F2d at 319 (citing Metro Broad., hIc. v. FC.C., 497
U.S. 547 (1990)).
214. Paula Branca-Santos, Inyustice Ignored: The nternnent of Italian-Ainericans During
World War II, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv 151, 152, 182 (2001).
215. Id. at 182. Her article, however, was published in the spring of 2001, before the
DOJ issued its report that November. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 1. One
wonders if she was pleased with the DOJ's report.
216. See, e.g., Karen Engle, Constucting Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing theWar on Terror(isn), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 5 (2004); Paul Lyon, The Presidential Interinent
Pouer Established by the 1942 Internment of Americans Suspected of Disloyalty, 13 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 23 (2003).
217. See, e.g., Max du Plessis, Reparations and International Law, 22 WINSDOR Y.B. Ac-
CESS TO JUST. 41, 66 (2003) (proposing a system of compensation for historical wrongs
under which, "instead of doling out money on the principle that past victims deserve
justice, the compensation becomes a vehicle for rectifying the social and economic prob-
lems that underpin today's victims' continuing marginalisation").
218. Jacobs, 959 E2d at 314.
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the same harm have not been protected, then the principle of equal pro-
tection suggests that the law must be changed to protect both groups
equally. Indeed,jacobs is consistent with such a statement, reasoning that if
Mr. Jacobs could have shown that he suffered the same kind of harm as
the Japanese, then the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause would
have supported his claim.2' In this way, it is less important whether com-
pensation is appropriate for Italian victims, for compensating persons of
Italian descent would be only one of many possible ways to correct an
equal protection violation.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately one must decide whether the two ethnic groups suffered
the same kind of harm, which of course has been the central factual in-
quiry of this Note. In my opinion, the newly-uncovered historical
evidence demonstrates that persons of Italian descent suffered the same
racial prejudice as persons of Japanese descent. The only difference is the
extent to which the government was able to act upon its prejudice. In
other words, because of practical, political, and economic considerations,
the government could not intern Germans and Italians in the same way
that it could intern the Japanese, which is to say, en masse. Thus, even if
government leaders were more prejudiced toward persons of Japanese
descent-as they may have been-their increased prejudice was probably
incidental to, and not determinative of, the kinds of restrictions eventually
imposed upon both groups.
If Congress still desires to compensate victims of the government's
wartime prejudice, as it clearly did when it passed the Civil Liberties Act
of 1988, then it should compensate such prejudice against persons of Ital-
ian descent as well. If, on the other hand, it no longer desires to
compensate past racial prejudice, then it should remove compensation for
persons of Japanese descent or devise some other strategy to satisfy equal
protection. The only impermissible option, in my opinion, is to leave the
law unchanged, for as it stands it protects only one of two ethnic groups
that were harmed by the same kind of government prejudice during the
220
war.
I recognize, however, that this conclusion rests on my interpretation
of the facts, and reasonable minds can of course differ with respect to
whether the new historical evidence supports the conclusion that persons
of Italian descent suffered the same kind of prejudice as persons of
219. Id. at 319.
220. Persons of German descent may have suffered the same prejudice as well, but
this Note has only investigated such prejudice as it applied against persons of Italian de-
scent. I think an inquiry into the German experience would be a good one; perhaps also
an inquiry into the restrictions on Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian aliens.
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Japanese descent. Yet it seems beyond question that this new evidence at
least casts significant doubt on Jacobs' assumption that the government
neither acted out of prejudice nor imposed widespread restrictions upon
persons of Italian descent. Clearly, it did both to some extent. Thus, if a
person of Italian descent were to bring a claim similar to that of Mr. Ja-
cobs, the court hearing his claim would at least need to grapple with the
new historical evidence and the factual questions posed in this Note.
Then, if it were to decide that Congress' decision to compensate only
persons of Japanese descent was still "a perfect fit between means and
ends" it would have to provide much more justification thanJacobs.
2 2
'
221. Jacobs, 959 F.2d at 319 (citing City of R3ichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,526-27 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment)).
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